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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND 
DESCRIPTION OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This matter is before the Supreme Court on Petition 
for Review of an adverse determination by the Utah State Tax 
Commission in a formal adjudicative proceeding on Petitioner 
Larry Zissi's Petition for Redetermination of a jeopardy tax 
assessment against him under the provisions of the Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act, Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-101 et seq. (1953, 
as amended). 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition 
for Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16 and 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the Tax Commission have granted Zissi's 
motion to suppress evidence of the pills on which the tax 
was based because their discovery was the result of an 
unconstitutional roadblock seizure? 
2. Did the Tax Commission err in ruling that the 
amphetamines at issue were not taxable by weight? 
3. Did the Tax Commission err in its construction 
the statutory term "dosage units"? 
4. Does the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate 
Zissi's constitutional right to equal protection? 
5. Is the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act unconsti-
tutionally vague? 
6. Does the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate 
2 
petitioner's right to freedom from self-incrimination? 
7. Is the tax assessed in this case an unconsti-
tutionally excessive fine? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
BELIEVED DETERMINATIVE 
Petitioner believes that the interpretation of the 
following statutes and constitutional provisions is determinative 
in this case. The complete text of the statutes and constitutional 
provisions cited is included in Addendum A attached at the 
end of this brief: 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-103 (1953, as amended) 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment VIII 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for review of a determination 
of the State Tax Commission upholding a jeopardy assessment 
of $22,000.00 in tax and $22,000.00 in penalties against petitioner 
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Larry Zissi (hereinafter "Zissi") under Utah's Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act, U.C.A. § 59-19-101 et seq. (1953, as amended) 
(the "Stamp Tax"). 
The facts as found by the Tax Commission or, where 
no findings were made on factual issues, all relevant evidence 
on those issues, are as follows. On June 4, 1988, Zissi was 
stopped at a driver's license roadblock while driving his 
1983 Chevrolet pickup truck, (Findings of Fact R.6). The 
roadblock was set up by five officers, including St* Doug 
Whitney and four deputies. (R.99). Sgt. Whitney was in charge 
of setting up the roadblock, and it was set up at his instigation. 
Sgt. Whitney is a sergeant on patrol with the Utah County 
Sheriff's Department. (R.101). It was Sgt. Whitney's decision 
to set up the roadblock (R.102). He gave his deputies verbal 
instructions to stop every vehicle for a driver's license 
and registration, to make sure that everything was current 
and up to date. No written instructions were given. He also 
told his deputies that if they found other violations to take 
appropriate action. That was the extent of the directions 
he gave. (R.102). 
The roadblock was set up on State Road 73 at Fairfield, 
and was set up from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. The deputies placed 
signs 100 yards before the roadblock which said "Sheriff's 
Office Roadblock Ahead." At the roadblock itself, there were 
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approximately eight pylon cones placed twenty to thirty feet 
apart. Then there was a cone with the sign "Sheriff's Roadblock 
Ahead." (R.98-100). 
After Mr. Zissi's vehicle was stopped at the roadblock, 
one of the deputies smelled an odor of marijuana. (R.102). 
After directing Mr. Zissi to drive to the side of the road, 
Mr. Zissi handed over a baggy of marijuana. (R.103). The 
officers then searched the vehicle and located a shaving cream 
bag behind the driver's seat of the pickup (R.103). Inside 
that bag were found what appeared to be crosstop pills. (R.104). 
Wayne Holman of the Tax Commission later counted the pills 
and determined that there were more than 500 and there were 
some that had been broken in pieces in transport and some 
had become powdered fragments. He counted the total number 
as 519. (R.129). 
Attached as Exhibit "B" to the Respondent's Brief 
submitted after the conclusion of the hearing was a document 
on Utah County Sheriff letterhead dated October 11, 1984, 
prepared by Lt. David Lamph regarding roadblocks. This document 
requires no need for establishment of a license and registration 
roadblock, places no restrictions on where or when such roadblocks 
will be instituted other than they are to be in a "safe location," 
places no restrictions on how to choose which cars will be 
stopped, and apparently allows driver's license and registration 
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roadblocks to be s e t up in the d i s c r e t i o n of any sergeant 
on patrol in the f ie ld for the Utah County She r i f f ' s Department. 
(R.46-47). 
After being advised by the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office of the seizure, the Utah State Tax Commission issued 
a jeopardy assessment against Mr. Zissi for tax and penalty 
totalling $44,000.00. (Exhibit 8, R.195-198) . U.C.A. § 59-19-103 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled 
substances as defined under this chapter at 
the following rates: 
(a) , , . 
(b) On each gram of controlled substance or 
each portion of a gram, $200; and 
(c) On each bO dosage units of a controlled 
substance that is not sold by weight, 
or portion thereof, $2,000. 
The statute contains no definition of the term "dosage 
units." Although the Tax Commission is authorized to adopt 
rules necessary to enforce the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, 
U.C.A. § 59-19-107(1), the Tax Commission has not issued any. 
(R.125). 
In making its jeopardy assessment, the Tax Commission 
first determined that the tax should be assessed under Subparagraph 
(c) on the number of dosage units of a controlled substance 
that is not sold by weight, rather than under Subparagraph 
(b) according to the weight of the controlled substance. 
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The Tax Commission found that amphetamines such 
as these are sold as pills and not sold by weight. (Findings 
of Fact 13, R.7). Gary Nuffer of the Tax Commission testified 
that his only basis for assessing the pills in this case according 
to the number of pills was "in our dealings and in our policy 
or procedures that we've done this that these were not sold 
by weight. They were sold by units." (R.122). 
Wayne Holman, an investigator for the Tax Commis-
sion, testified that amphetamines are sold by weight in powder 
form. He stated that if these pills had been ground into 
powder form, they would be taxed by weight. (R.128). He 
said they look at the form of the substance to determine whether 
it was sold by weight or otherwise. (R.128). He agreed he 
had no knowledge of whether the pills in this case had been 
sold by weight or by the number of pills. (R.128). 
Loni DeLand, a criminal defense attorney and former 
narcotics agent, testified that amphetamines can be used by 
injection, inhalation, ingestion or by suppositories. They 
can be used any of these ways whether the amphetamines are 
purchased as a pill or as a powder. In order to inject them, 
you would have to grind up the pills into powder form. He 
testified that amphetamines are primarily sold by weight in 
powder form. He didn't recall purchasing pills by weight, 
but supposed they could be. (R.138). 
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Kendra Herlin, a narcotics agent called by the Tax 
Commission, testified that she had not seen amphetamine tablets 
sold by weight. (R.158). She said crystal methamphetamine 
powder is more expensive than pills. (R.169). 
After determining that the amphetamines which had 
been seized should be taxed at the rate of $2,000.00 per each 
50 dosage units, the Tax Commission construed each pill as 
a "dosage unit" under the statute. (Findings of Fact 12f R.7). 
Gary Nuffer's understanding of the term "dosage" 
is "what you would consume at one time." (R.123). But based 
on the advice of the Commission's investigator, Wayne Holman, 
he imposed a tax based on one pill being one dosage unit. 
(R.122). Mr. Nuffer said that the Commission would construe 
one pill to be one dosage unit regardless of the size of the 
pill. (R.124). Wayne Holman said he advised Mr. Nuffer that 
each pill is a dosage unit. (R.127). He said "by definition, 
. . . a dose would be something prescribed by a medical phy-
sician. And a unit, by definition, is one item." (R.127. 
He had no information on the quantity of amphetamines generally 
prescribed by a physician. (R.128). 
Loni Deland was asked what dosage unit means, and 
said that depends to a degree on a person's tolerance. (R.139). 
Some people inject 1/2 gram in one dosage and sometimes more. 
He'd seen people take them by the pill form—probably as little 
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as 5 at a time on some occasions. Typically, people would 
buy 100 pills and soak the entire thing and inject it. (R.140). 
He testified that the term "dosage unit" would have a definite 
meaning for a legal drug. There is a legal methamphetamine 
on the market—Desoxyn. He said for the pills which were 
seized, there is no legal dosage unit, and that to him the 
dosage unit is what the abuser takes—1/2 gram is not unusual, 
and a truck driver will probably take somewhat less. He said 
in these pills, at 1/2 gram a dosage unit, there would be 
5 dosage units. (R.140-41). 
Neither of the dictionaries excerpted as exhibits 
had definitions for "dosage unit" or for "unit dose." (Exhibits 
9 and 10, R. 199-206). Steadman's Medical Dictionary defines 
dosage as: 
1. The giving of medicine or other therapeutic 
agent in prescribed amounts. 2. The determina-
tion of the proper dose of a remedy. Often 
incorrectly used for the word dose. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines dosage 
as including: 
l.a. The amount of medicine or other therapeutic 
agent prescribed or proper for a given patient 
or illness. . . 2.a. Addition of some ingredient 
or application of or treatment with some agent 
in one or more measured doses 
Both dictionaries defined a dose in essentially the same terms. 
The Webster's Dictionary defined dose as: 
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The measured quantity of a medicine or other 
therapeutic agent to be taken at one time or 
in a period of time. 
Steadman's Medical Dictionary defines unit as: 
1. One, a single person or thing. 2. A standard 
of measure, weight or any other quality, by 
multiplications or fractions of which a scale 
or system is formed. 3. A group of persons 
or things considered as a whole because of 
mutual activities or functions. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes unit, 
in relevant part as: 
l.a.(l): The first natural number; the number 
that is the least whole number and is expressed 
by the number one, (2) a single thing that 
constitutes an undivided whole. . . .(c) a 
determinate quantity as of length, time, heat, 
value, or housing, adopted as a standard of 
measurement for other quantities of the same 
kind. 
The value of the pills seized was between $75.00 
and $150.00. (R.139, 161). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Zissi's motion to suppress all evidence of the 
pills seized in this case should have been granted, and the 
jeopardy assessment for possession of the pills voided. The 
exclusionary rule applies in tax proceedings, and is especially 
applicable to this quasi-criminal tax proceeding, just as 
it applies in forfeiture proceedings. The seizure of Mr. Zissi 
and his vehicle at the roadblock in this case violated his 
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Fourth Amendment rights because his privacy rights were invaded 
at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field, who 
determined when, where, and how to set up the roadblock without 
any plan instituted by administrative level personnel. 
Because the United States Supreme Court has not 
ruled on the issue presented, this Court should base its decision 
on Utah constitutional grounds. Further, there is no reason 
to allow an exception to the warrant requirement for roadblocks, 
and this Court should hold that a statute authorizing roadblocks 
and setting forth a procedure for obtaining warrants for roadblocks 
is required for a valid roadblock under the Utah Constitution. 
Because of the evidence that amphetamines are a 
controlled substance which is sold by weight, it was improper 
to tax the amphetamines in this case on a per pill basis. 
The Tax Commission's construction of the Tax Stamp statute 
liberally, rather than strictly, construes the statute and 
yields a result which violates Mr. Zissi's right to equal 
protection by imposing disproportionate taxation on the same 
controlled substance depending only on the meaningless distinction 
of whether it is seized in pill or powder form. Since there 
is no evidence of the weight of the pills or that they were 
of taxable weight, the jeopardy assessment should be invalidated. 
Even if these amphetamines should be taxed according 
to the number of "dosage units" they contain, a person of 
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ordinary intelligence would understand that term to mean the 
amount of a controlled substance which comprises a dosage. 
The Tax Commission adopted a liberal definition to maximize 
taxability, but that definition is known only to those in 
the medical profession. The interpretation that a dosage 
unit means one pill makes the statute in violation of Mr. Zissi's 
right to due process by adopting an unconstituionally vague 
definition of the term "dosage units." The evidence shows 
the dosage for the pills involved to be at least five, and 
closer to 50 pills. The assessment against petitioner should 
be reduced to reflect this. 
The Stamp Tax statute does not prohibit the Tax 
Commission from providing law enforcement authorities information 
relevant to determining the identity of stamp purchasers. 
It also requires the stamps to be affixed to the controlled 
substances they relate to. The purchase and display of the 
stamps create an appreciable risk of supplying a vital link 
in a prosecution for possession of controlled substances — 
the identity of those in possession and their knowledge of 
the illegal nature of the substance. The Stamp Tax therefore 
violates Mr. Zissi's right to freedom from self-incrimination 
under the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
The prohibitions against excessive fines found in 
the United States and Utah Constitutions apply with regard 
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to the essentially criminal Stamp Tax law. Because a person 
in possession of amphetamine pills is subject to a huge fine 
while a person in possession of the same quantity of amphetamine 
powder is not taxed, the Stamp Tax violates the principle 




THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16(4) gives guidance 
as to the standard of review of the Tax Commission's determinations 
of fact and of law. This Court should grant relief if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, Mr. Zissi has been prejudiced 
by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule 
on which the agency action is based, is unconsti-
tutional on its face or as applied; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination 
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that 
is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court. 
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The facts stated above marshal1 all evidence presented 
to the Commission on the factual questions impliedly determined 
against him. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
II. 
ALL EVIDENCE OF THE PILLS SEIZED IN 
THIS CASE AND ON WHICH THE TAX IS BASED SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY ARE THE FRUIT OF AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ROADBLOCK SEIZURE 
A. The Exclusionary Rule Applies in this Proceeding. 
Courts have held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule is applicable in a federal civil tax proceeding. Efriant 
Suriez, 58 T.C. 792 (1972); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 
(N.D. Ohio 1966) ; Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693 
(S.D. Iowa 1980) . 
Policy reasons also favor application of the exclusionary 
rule in tax proceedings. Evidence relating to tax matters 
often depends on the most personal of a person's effects and 
papers, and would often be located in the home. The power 
of taxation is broad and those charged with enforcing it are 
often perceived as oppressive. The exclusionary rule should 
apply to prevent a positive incentive for Tax Commission and 
law enforcement authorities to violate constitutional rights 
of taxpayers in order to find evidence to raise tax revenues. 
Thus, the exclusionary rule should apply in state tax proceedings. 
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Particularly in this case for the enforcement of 
the Stamp Tax, the exclusionary rule should apply. In One 
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), 
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies 
to civil forfeiture proceedings. The Supreme Court noted 
that the leading case on the subject of search and seizure 
is Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) which was itself 
not a criminal case but a proceeding by the United States 
to forfeit property. The Supreme Court stated that 
A forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in 
character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, 
is to penalize for the commission of an offense 
against the law . . . . It would be anomalous 
indeed under these circumstances, to hold that 
in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized 
evidence is excludible, while in the forfeiture 
proceeding, requiring the. determination that 
the criminal law has been violated, the same 
evidence would be admissible. One Plymouth 
1958 Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra at 700-701. 
This unusual tax proceeding, like a forfeiture proceed-
ing, involves an additional penalty imposed upon the illegal 
possession of controlled substances. The fact that the legislature 
has chosen to do so by a tax does not change the character 
of the proceeding. Just as the Supreme Court noted in the 
forfeiture situation, the penalties to be imposed upon petitioner 
by the tax and tax penalty in this case far exceed any penalties 
which could be criminally assessed against him for possession 
of the controlled substances or even the criminal penalty 
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for failure to obtain the illegal drug stamps. In this situation, 
particularly, it is clear that the exclusionary rule must 
apply. 
B. The Roadblock Involved in this Case was an Unconstitutional 
Seizure, and the Evidence Resulting from that Seizure must 
be Suppressed. 
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the 
Supreme Court held that a patrolman's stopping of a vehicle 
without reasonable suspicion to check for license and registration 
was an unconstitutional seizure, and that the evidence discovered 
as a result of the patrolman's seizing marijuana in plain 
view on the car floor must be suppressed. First, the Court 
held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated 
because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of those amendments, 
even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention quite brief. j^ d. at 654. The Court summarized 
its decision as follows: 
We hold that except in those situations where 
there is at least articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or 
that an automobile is not registered, or that 
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise 
subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping 
an automobile and detaining the driver in order 
to check his driver's license and registration 
of the automobile are unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude 
the State of Delaware or other States from 
developing methods for spot checks that involve 
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less intrusion or that do not involve the uncon-
strained exercise of discretion. Questioning 
of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops 
is one possible alternative. J[d. at 664. 
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court stated that the 
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests. J^ d. at 665. The Supreme Court recognized 
that the State had an interest in assuring the safety of its 
roadways, but held that discretionary spot checks of license 
and registration in service of those interests did not justify 
the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interest which such stops 
entail. The Court noted that the primary method of enforcing 
traffic and vehicle safety regulations is acting upon observed 
violations, that drivers without licenses are presumably the 
less safe drivers whose propensities may well exhibit themselves, 
and that in the absence of empirical data to the contrary, 
"it must be assumed that finding an unlicensed driver among 
those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely 
event than finding an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly 
from the entire universe of drivers." J^ d. at 660. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated a three-
factor test or analysis in balancing the competing interests 
to determine the reasonableness of warrantless searches or 
seizures as: 
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[A] weighing of the gravity of the public concerns 
served by the seizure, the degree to which 
the seizure advances the public interest, and 
the severity of the interference with individual 
liberty. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-55 
(1979) 
The easiest and most common fallacy in "balancing" 
is to place on one side the entire, cumulated 
"interest" represented by the state's policy 
and compare it with one individual's interest 
in freedom from specific intrusion on the other 
side. ... [cite] A fairer balance would weigh 
the actual expected alleviation of the social 
ill against the cumulated interests invaded. 
City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775, 
778 (1988). 
In applying these factors to the situation of warrant-
less roadblock seizures, the Supreme Court of Kansas has set 
out what it considered to be relevant factors. 
Among the factors which should be considered 
are: (1) The degree of discretion, if any, 
left to the officer in the field; (2) the location 
designated for the roadblock; (3) the time 
and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards 
set by superior officers; (5) advance notice 
to the public at large; (6) advance warning 
to the individual approaching motorists; (7) 
maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree 
of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of 
operation; (9) average length of time each 
motorist is detained; (10) physical factors 
surrounding the location, type and method of 
operation; (11) the availability of less intrustive 
methods for combatting the problem; (12) the 
degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and 
(13) any other relevant circumstances which 
might bear upon the test. Not all of the factors 
need to be favorable to the state but all which 
are applicable to a given roadblock should 
be considered. Some, of course, such as unbridled 
discretion of the officer in the field would 
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run afoul of Prouse regardless of other favorable 
factors. State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174, 
1185 (Kan. 1983). (emphasis added) 
Courts of other states have adopted or approved 
the considerations set out by the Kansas Court. State v. Jones, 
483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676 
(Tex. App. 1985) . Each of these cases also recognized that 
some factors can prove fatal to a roadblock regardless of 
the existence of other favorable conditions. In Webb v. State, 
supra, the Texas court specifically agreed that such a factor 
is the unbridled discretion of an officer in the field. Id_. at 
681. In that case, the court stated: 
The only criteria supporting the constitutionality 
of the roadblock in question is that every 
car was stopped. . . . The only evidence of 
"an overall plan" is the testimony of the field 
officer that he didn't just indiscriminately 
happen to pick a street. The record contains 
no specific standards established by superior 
officers for setting up the roadblock or to 
structure the procedure to be followed by the 
officers present at the scene. The Fourth 
Amendment requires an actual showing that the 
proper procedures were followed at the time 
of the inspection. I_d. at 683 (emphasis in 
original). 
Other cases after Delaware v. Prouse, supra, have 
held that roadblocks established at the discretion of officers 
in the field constitute illegal seizures, the fruits of which 
must be suppressed. In State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 
461 (1986), the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that evidence 
of intoxication had been illegally obtained as the result 
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of an unconstitutional roadblock stop and had to be suppressed. 
In that case, four or five patrolmen and a Sergeant determined 
to set up a transitory checkpoint at which every fourth vehicle 
reaching it would be stopped. The field officers were not 
acting under any standards, guidelines or procedures promulgated 
by the policy makers for the police department. The Nebraska 
Court quoted Delaware v. Prouse, supra, regarding a discretionary 
stop for license and registration checks as follows: 
This kind of standardless and unconstrained 
discretion is the evil the Court has discerned 
when in previous cases it has insisted that 
the discretion of the officer in the field 
be circumscribed, at least to some extent. 
State v. Crom, supra at 463. 
The Court also quoted the following language from Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47 (1979): 
A central concern in balancing these competing 
considerations in a variety of settings has 
been to assure that an individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitray 
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion 
of officers in the field. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska then stated: 
The uncontradicted evidence in the case before 
us is that there was no plan formulated at 
the policymaking level of the Omaha police 
department, or elsewhere, which considered, 
weighed, and balanced the factors enumerated 
in Delaware and Brown. Rather, a six-or-seven-
person unit within the department, commanded 
by a field sergeant, was left free to decide 
when, where, and how to establish and operate 
the transitory checkpoint in question. The 
checkpoint was thus subject to the constitutional 
infirmity found to exist in both Delaware and 
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Brown; that is, a driver's reasonable expectation 
of privacy was rendered subject to arbitrary 
invasion solely at the unfetered discretion 
of officers in the field. Id., at 463. 
The South Dakota Supreme Court similarly found a 
roadblock unconstitutional when set up at the discretion of 
officers in the field, stating "in the absence of record evidence 
that the decision to establish the roadblock was made by anyone 
other than the officers in the field, the roadblock in question 
[has] certain characteristics of a roving patrol" namely, 
an appreciable risk of an arbitrary basis for the site or 
time decision. State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976). 
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1989) 
involved a situation very similar to that presented in this 
case. There, two Virginia State Troopers set up a roadblock 
to check driver's licenses, registration and equipment. They 
stopped all vehicles entering the roadblock. They established 
the roadblock without any prior direction from their supervisors 
and without an existing plan. The troopers had total discretion 
regarding where and when they would set up the roadblock. 
The trial court held that because all traffic was stopped 
and checked, the seizure did not violate Simmons' Fourth Amendment 
rights, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. The court 
stated: 
We do not read Prouse to stand for the proposition 
that stopping all traffic at a roadblock constitutes 
sufficient restraint on the exercise of discretion 
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by police officers to transform the stop into 
a constitutionally valid roadblock. . . . [T]he 
roadblock also must be undertaken pursuant 
to an explicit plan or practice which uses 
neutral criteria and limits the discretion 
of the officers conducting the roadblock. 
The evidence in this case establishes that 
the decision to establish the roadblock as 
well as its location and duration was solely 
within the discretion of the troopers. No 
advance approval or authoriztion from any supervisor 
or superior officer was required to set up 
the roadblock, ^d. at 658-59. 
Other cases holding roadblock seizures unconstitutional 
because of insufficient constraints on the discretion of officers 
in the field include State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 
136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 
562 (Okl. Cr. 1984); and State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 
706 P.2d 225 (1985) . 
The roadblock in this case suffered from the same 
constitutional infirmities as the cases just cited. Particularly, 
it involves the fatal defect of unbridled discretion of the 
officers in the field. Sgt. Whitney, the field officer, a 
sergeant on patrol who was at the roadblock and in charge 
of the other officers there, personally made the decision 
to set up the roadblock. None of the officers were given 
written directions about how to set it up or the duration 
of it or how to proceed. Clearly, there was no administrative 
level decision, nor any plan instituted after carefully balancing 
the interests to be served by the roadblock against the intrusion 
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on privacy of all the people to be stopped at the roadblock 
prior to its implementation. Everything about the roadblock 
was left to the discretion of the officers in the field and 
the precise dangers present in the cases just cited, and condemned 
in Delaware v. Prouse were present. For that reason, the 
roadblock stop constituted an unconstitutional seizure, and 
the evidence discovered as a result of that seizure must be 
suppressed. 
In an attempt to show some sort of administrative 
level decision regarding the roadblock at issue in this case, 
the Collection Division of the Tax Commission attached Exhibit 
"B" to its Brief of Respondent before the Tax Commission (R. 
46-47) , which purports to be the roadblock policy of the Utah 
County Sheriff. That purported policy is not part of the 
record at the hearing and could not be considered by the Tax 
Commission or by this Court. This was a formal hearing under 
the provisions of Chapter 46b of Title 63, Utah Code Annotated. 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-10 (1) (a) requires the hearing 
officer to make findings of fact "based exclusively on the 
evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts 
officially noted." 
The purported Utah County roadblock policy was not 
presented at the hearing, was not given under oath, is not 
part of the record, and should be disregarded. Even if it 
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could be considered, the purported policy contains no meaningful 
limits on the discretion of officers in the field. It contains 
no limitations on the field officer's selection of a site 
for a license and registration roadblock. It does not contain 
any requirement that there be a showing or any existence of 
need for license and registration roadblocks. It contains 
nothing limiting the officers' discretion in how to choose 
what cars to stop, and contains nothing about the procedures 
to be used -- how long to detain cars, what should be said 
to those who are stopped, or anything at all about methods 
to be used to limit the intrustion on drivers' privacy in 
conducting such a roadblock. 
Other factors also indicate that the constitutional 
balancing required tips the balance toward unconstitutionality 
of the roadblock at issue here. The governmental interest 
involved is to locate people driving without valid licenses 
or registration. While admittedly a valid interest, the importance 
of that interest should not be blown out of proportion. Preventing 
drunk driving, for example, is certainly a much more important 
interest. There is no evidence in this case of any problems 
experienced by the Utah County Sheriff's Office regarding 
unlicensed drivers or unregistered vehicles. There is no 
evidence that the less intrusive method of making stops only 
on articulable suspicion of violations is not more effective 
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in locating unlicensed drivers or unregistered vehicles. 
The United States Supreme Court in Prouse noted that it could 
be assumed that unlicensed drivers would be those more likely 
to be stopped for traffic violations. There is no evidence 
of the effectiveness of the roadblock procedure in this case. 
The record at the hearing contains no evidence of the number 
of vehicles stopped or the number of license and registration 
violations discovered. There is no evidence of advance notice 
to the public. The advance warning to motorists occurred 
100 yards before the roadblock. If the roadblock in this 
case were found to be constitutional, any policeman anywhere 
for no reason at all could on his own initiative set up a 
roadblock and detain every single car and driver at his absolute 
discretion to seek evidence of violations of which he has 
no knowledge or even suspicion. The seizure of Mr. Zissi 
and his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. All evidence 
of the pills seized from him should be suppressed/ and the 
jeopardy assessment against him invalidated. 
C. The Roadblock in This Case Resulted in an Unconstitutional 
Seizure under the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution also 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures in terms 
nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. This Court has 
indicated an interest in separate constitutional analysis 
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under the Utah Constitution and has held out at least the 
possibility of giving the Utah Constitutional provision separate 
vitality. 
Indeed, choosing to give the Utah Constitution 
a somewhat different construction may prove 
to be an appropriate method for insulating 
the state's citizens from the vagaries of incon-
sistent interpretations given the Fourth Amendment 
by the Federal•Courts. State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, involving warrantless roadblock seizures, it 
is appropriate for this Court to rest its ruling on independently 
sufficient state constitutional grounds. 
The first reason for doing so is that there is no 
definitive statement from the United States Supreme Court 
regarding the constitutional permissibility of warrantless 
roadblock stops. Without knowing the precise limits which 
the United States Supreme Court might set, this Court has 
the opportunity to say that under the Utah Constitution, the 
roadblock set up in this case at the absolute discretion of 
officers in the field is an impermissible invasion of constitu-
tionally protected rights. This is so for all the reasons 
set forth in the cases cited in the preceding section. It 
is also the approach taken by the Appellate Division of the 
New Jersey Superior Court in State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 
493 A.2d 1271 (N.J. App. 1985). In that case, the court relied 
on Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, 
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even though it is almost identical in wording to the Fourth 
Amendment. The New Jersey Court analyzed only cases involving 
the Fourth Amendment in arriving at this decisionf but determined 
to rest its decision on state constitutional grounds by following 
the lead suggested by Justice O'Connor in Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983), in which she stated: 
It is fundamental that state courts be left 
free and unfettered by us in interpreting their 
state constitutions. 
The New Jersey Court in State v. Kirk, supra, concluded that 
a roadblock set up in the absolute, unbridled discretion of 
officers in the field was unconstitutional under the New Jersey 
Constitution. 
The second reason for resting a decision in this 
case on adequate state constitutional grounds is that the 
developing interpretations of law under the Fourth Amendment 
and under Delaware v. Prouse, supra, simply provide inadequate 
protection for the vast majority of innocent motorists who 
might be subjected to warrantless roadblock seizures of their 
vehicles at the whim of the police. Requiring a roadblock 
to be approved and carried out under a plan formulated by 
supervisory administrative officials in the police department 
is not sufficient protection. There is nothing to require 
an adequate balancing of the competing interests in advance 
in such a system. Generally, warrantless searches and seizures 
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which have been held reasonable have been upheld because of 
the need to act before a warrant could be obtained. Such 
considerations have resulted in Terry stops on reasonable 
suspicionf searches incident to arrest, and searches of automobiles 
based on probable cause. But the situation in a roadblock 
is much different. It is carefully planned in advance. There 
is nothing to prevent some prior authorization for the roadblock, 
either in the form of a warrant issued by a judicial officer 
or a legislative enactment providing for such roadblocks, 
or both. The situation of roadblocks presents no reason for 
abandoning the check and balance of having a non-executive 
level decision authorizing a roadblock in advance. 
The State of Idaho held roadblocks instituted for 
the purpose of detecting driving under the influence of alcohol 
to be unconstitutional under the Idaho Constitution, where 
the roadblocks were instituted without express legislative 
authority, particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, 
or prior judicial approval. State of Idaho v. Henderson, 
114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988). The Idaho provision, 
like the Utah provision, is virtually identical to the Fourth 
Amendment. The Idaho Court stated that: 
Roadblocks are an inefficient and unnecessary 
constraint on a person's right to remain free 
of search or seizure absent probable cause. 
Id. 756 P.2d at 1061. (emphasis in original) 
The Court also noted that the roadblocks were not conducted 
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pursuant to authority granted by the Idaho Legislature. Id. 
Similarly in Utah, there is no legislative authority for road-
blocks. The Idaho Court quoted from a Pennsylvania case as 
follows: 
While the arguments supporting the constitutionality 
of systematic roadblocks are persuasive, the 
rational supporting them is flawed. No amount 
of control or limited discretion can justify 
the "seizure11 that takes place in the complete 
absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
that a motor vehicle violation has occurred. 
Id. at 1062. 
The Idaho Court also quoted State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 
564-65 (Okl. App. 1984), as follows: 
The court finds such activities by law enforcement 
authorities, while commendable in their ultimate 
goal of removing DUI offenders from the public 
highways, draw dangerously close to what may 
be referred to as a police state. Here, the 
state agencies have ignored the presumption 
of innocence, assuming that criminal conduct 
must be occurring on the roads and highways, 
and have taken an "end justifies the means" 
approach. . . . [A] basic tenet of American 
jurisprudence is that the government cannot 
assume criminal conduct in effectuating a stop 
such as the one presented herein. Were the 
authorities allowed to maintain such activities 
as presented in this case, the next logical 
step would be to allow similar stops for searching 
out other types of criminal offenders. State 
v. Henderson, supra, 756 P.2d at 1063. 
Without determining exactly what would be required to uphold 
a roadblock, the Idaho Supreme Court held that: 
Where police lack express legislative authority, 
particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing 
and prior judicial approval, roadblocks established 
to apprehend drunk drivers cannot withstand 
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constitutional scrutiny. Id. 
The Washington Supreme Court has found DUI roadblocks 
to be in violation of the Washington Constitution. City of 
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988). 
The Washington Constitutional provision prohibits disturbing 
a person in his private affairs or invading his home "without 
authority of law." In that case, because the City of Seattle 
failed to show that the DUI roadblock fell within an exception 
to the warrant requirement, the roadblock was held unconstitutional 
under the Washington Constitution. 
The Oregon Supreme Court held that a roadblock violated 
Article If Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution where there 
was no statutory or judicial authorization for the roadblock 
given in advance. The Oregon constitutional provision provides: 
No law shall violate the right of the people 
... against unreasonable search, or seizure, 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause. 
The Oregon Supreme Court summarized its decision as follows: 
Neither the state nor the county officials 
point to a statute or ordinance establishing 
an administrative scheme allowing sobriety 
roadblocks to prevent driving while intoxicated. 
Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 
692 (1987). 
There is also analogous Utah precedent. In Industrial 
Commission v. Wasatch Metal & Salvage Co., 594 P.2d 894 (Utah 
1979) , this Court held that administrative searches under 
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the. Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 must be 
based on a warrant, and held a provision allowing searches 
without a warrant unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment 
and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Although it appears possible that federal constitutional law 
has deviated from the warrant requirement as to administrative 
seizures for drivers license roadblocks, this Court should 
treat an administrative seizure such as occurred in the roadblock 
in this case the same as it treated the administrative search 
in the case just cited, and require that roadblocks be instituted 
only after obtaining a proper warrant to conduct such an admini-
strative seizure in advance of the institution of the roadblock. 
Such a procedure will provide real protections of the constitu-
tional rights of the huge majority of innocent motorists, 
while also providing an avenue for proper roadblocks to be 
instituted when necessary in the opinion of a judicial officer 
outside the executive branch who is trained in performing 
the sort of constitutional balancing required. At the least, 
this Court should require statutory authorization for roadblocks 
in order to make the decision politically accountable. 
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III. 
THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IMPOSED 
BY THE TAX COMMISSION TO TAX ZISSI 
IN THIS CASE IS IMPROPER 
A. Relevant Principles of Statutory Construction. 
There are three relevant principles of statutory 
constructionf each of which has been violated by the Tax Commis-
sion's decision upholding the huge tax assessed against Peti-
tioner. Each of the principles is a common one. The first 
is that the terms of a statute should be given an interpretation 
and application which is in accord with their usually accepted 
meanings. Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt 
Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983); Grant v. Utah State 
Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). The second 
principle is that taxing statutes are strictly construed against 
the taxing authority and favorably to the tax payer. Continental 
Telephone Co. of Utah v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 539 
P.2d 447 (Utah 1975). Thus, doubts as to meaning of terms 
in a tax statute are to be resolved in favor of the tax payer. 
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax Commission, 
16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964), modified 16 Utah 2d 255, 
399 P. 2d 145 (1965). The third principle is that if by any 
reasonable construction the statute can be made to harmonize 
with constitutional provisions, it will be so construed. 
State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1983); Timpanogos 
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Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984). In this casef 
the Tax Commission failed to apply these provisions in two 
respects. First, by failing to assess taxes on the amphetamines 
seized on the basis of their weight. Second, by interpreting 
the statutory term "dosage unit*1 to mean each individual pill 
which was seized. Each of these issues will be discussed 
separately below in light of the principles of statutory 
construction just described. 
B. Amphetamines Should Be Taxed By Weight. 
U.C.A. § 59-19-103 imposes a tax on controlled substances 
as follows: 
(b) On each gram of controlled substance, 
or each portion of a gram, $200; and 
(c) On each 50 dosage units of a controlled 
substance that is not sold by weight, or portion 
thereof, $2,000. 
The Tax Commission found that amphetamines are sold 
by the pill or quantity of pills when in pill form. That 
finding is not disputed, but its sufficiency to determine 
whether the amphetamine pills which were seized should not 
be taxed by weight is disputed. The uncontested testimony 
in this case is that amphetamines are generally sold in powder 
form and generally sold by weight. If these pills had been 
ground into powder form, they would be taxed according to weight. 
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The principles of statutory construction noted above 
require that these pills should have been assessed on their 
weight. First, tax statutes must be strictly construed against 
the taxing authority. There is no question that amphetamines 
are the controlled substance at issue here and that they are 
sold by weight. The statute makes no mention of the form 
of the substance. The tax on amphetamines should be assessed 
by weight, because it is not a "controlled substance that 
is not sold by weight." U.C.A. § 59-14-103(c). The tax would 
be much less based on the weight of the substance, in fact, 
the amount which was seized was probably not taxable based 
on weight. To allow the Tax Commission to assess a tax hugely 
out of proportion to the tax which would be assessed on a 
similar amount of amphetamine powder is not indicated by the 
terms of the statute and broadly, rather than strictly, construes 
the taxing authority under the statute. 
Finally, the construction given by the Tax Commission 
exalts the form of the controlled substance over the controlled 
substance itself, and creates an equal protection problem 
in the enforcement of this statute, as will be discussed in 
Section IV below. In order to avoid the equal protection 
problem of greatly different taxes based upon possession of 
identical quantities of the same controlled substance, the 
Tax Commission should charge taxes on amphetamines on the 
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basis of weight, which is how they are generally sold* 
The Tax Commission has authority to issue regulations 
under the Stamp Tax. U.C.A. § 59-19-107. By following appropriate 
rule-making procedures, the Tax Commission could interpret 
the statute and determine which controlled substances are 
sold by weight and which are not. But without such rules, 
it is improper for the Tax Commission to treat amphetamines 
as taxable by weight in some circumstances and by the number 
of pills in others, in order to impose the maximum conceivable 
tax in every case. 
C. Even if the Tax Should be Assessed According to the 
Number of Dosage Units, the Tax Commission Erred in Construing 
Each Pill as a Dosage Unit. 
U.C.A. § 59-19-103 (1) (c) imposes a tax of $2,000 
"on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is 
not sold by weight.'1 There is no definition in the statutes 
of the term "dosage units." No regulations interpreting the 
statutes have been issued by the Tax Commission. There is 
no reasonable way to arrive at a single pill being a dosage 
unit if a pill does not constitute what a dosage would be. 
Under the dictionary definitions in the record, a reasonable 
interpretation of "dosage unit" is a standard measure of the 
amount of a controlled substance taken at one time. If 5 
or 50 pills are taken as a dosage, that would be a dosage 
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unit, because it would be the amount of amphetamines taken 
as a dosage, which would be the single undivided whole dosage. 
The Tax Commission gave a construction of the statute 
which disregards the meaning of the term dosage and equates 
the term dosage unit with unit dose, a term which all evidence 
indicates is not intelligible to the average person. The 
construction given by the Tax Commission does not give the 
words dosage unit their ordinary meaning. It gives those 
words a meaning known only in the medical profession, and 
a meaning contrary to the common understanding of the term 
dosage. Gary Nuffer clearly understood the meaning of the 
term dosage which he described as "what you would consume 
at one time." The Tax Commission simply hasn't followed the 
definition it understood of that term in assessing this tax. 
Rather than determine the meaning of "dosage units" by its 
common meaning, the Tax Commission liberally construed that 
term to provide for maximum taxation by equating each pill 
with a dosage unit. Finally, tax statutes are to be construed 
to avoid constitutional problems, and the construction of 
the term dosage units given by the Tax Commission creates 
a constitutional problem of vagueness, as will be discussed 
in Section V below, by giving a construction to the term which 
is not intelligible to the ordinary person. 
For these reasons, this Court should hold that if 
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the tax should be based on the number of "dosage units," that 
term should be given the meaning which would be ascribed by 
ordinary people, which is the amount of controlled substance 
taken on the average by abusers* Petitioner has presented 
evidence that that amount is not less than 5 pills per dosage 
unit, and maybe as much as 100 pills. 
IV. 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION 
OF THE STATUTE CREATES A VIOLATION OF 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
If the statute requires the Tax Commission to tax 
amphetamines on a per pill basis when in that form but on 
the basis of weight when in powder form, that violates Mr. Zissi's 
right to equal protection. He is guaranteed the right to 
equal protection of law by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and by Article I, Sections 7 and 
24 of the Utah Constitution. 
Equal protection protects against discrimination 
within a class. The legislature has considerable 
discretion in the designation of classifications 
but the Court must determine whether such classi-
fications operate equally on all persons similarly 
situated. State Tax Commission v. Department 
of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978). 
In applying that principle, this Court determined that the 
tax on one insurer from among a larger class of insurers to 
pay a tax imposed on no one else is arbritrary and constitutionally 
prohibited. 
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This Court has also noted that Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general 
fundamental principles as are incorporated in the equal protection 
clause but that construction of Article I, Section 24 is not 
controlled by federal courts' construction of the equal protection 
clause. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). In that 
case, in which the automobile guest statute was held to be 
in violation of equal protection, the Court stated the test 
for meeting equal protection standards. 
Whether a statute meets equal protection standards 
depends in the first instance upon the objectives 
of the statute and whether the classifications 
established provide a reasonable basis for 
promoting those objectives* . . . 
Article I, Section 24 protects against two 
types of discrimination. First, a law must 
apply equally to all persons within a class. 
[cites] Second, the statutory classifications 
and the different treatment given the classes 
must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statutes. 
[cite] If the relationship of the classification 
to the statutory objectives is unreasonable 
or fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable. 
[cite] . _Id. at 670-71. 
Applying these standards to this case, the purpose 
of the Stamp Tax is to inhibit and punish those in possession 
of controlled substances. But the construction of the statute 
claimed by the Tax Commission, imposes a $22,000 tax on Mr. Zissi 
for possession of amphetamine pills while admitting that if 
those pills had been crushed, the tax would be determined 
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by weight and in this case no tax would be payable, is arbitrary 
and capricious. The powder form of amphetamines must be regarded 
as the more dangerous form, being readily injectible. There 
is no reasonable basis on which a person possessing an equal 
amount of powdered amphetamines could receive no tax but this 
petitioner be taxed $22,000 merely because of a difference 
in the form in which the identical controlled substance is 
discovered. If the Tax Commission's construction of the Stamp 
Tax statutes is correct, the statute must be unenforceable 
as in violation of the federal and state equal protection 
guarantees. 
When persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or 
a group of persons from among a larger class 
on the basis of a tenuous justification that 
has little or no merit. Malan v. Lewis, supra, 
at 671. 
V. 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF A 
"DOSAGE UNIT" TO MEAN EACH PILL, REGARDLESS 
OF DOSAGE, RENDERS THE STATUTE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND IN VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS 
The Tax Commission claims that a "dosage unit" is 
different from a dosage. The Tax Commission relies on a term 
common in medical circles, "unit dose" which is said to be 
discussed in those circles as synonymous with "dosage unit" 
in order to define a dosage unit as a single pill. But both 
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the pharmacist and the narcotics agent who testified about 
this meaning agreed that people on the street don't use the 
term dosage unit or unit dose and wouldn't know the meanings 
which those terms have in medical circles. The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
requires that statutes or regulations be sufficiently specific 
to provide fair notice of what they proscribe* Basslett v. Cota, 
761 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1985). Statutes must provide adequate 
warning as to what they command or forbid such that persons 
of common intelligence will not have to guess at their meaning 
and may act accordingly. Fleming v. D.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, 713 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1983); State v. Blowers, 717 
P.2d 1322 (Utah 1986). The problem with a vague statute is 
two fold: it fails to provide the public with fair notice 
of what is required, and it allows fundamentally legislative 
decisions to be made on a subjective basis at the point of 
enforcement rather than enactment. Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 
682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1982). In this case, the only interpre-
tation of the statute which persons of common intelligence 
could understand is that a "dosage unit" is the amount which 
would be taken as a dosage. The term "dosage unit" in the 
statute appears to be an attempt to make the statute more 
fair by assessing the tax on the number of dosages comprising 
a particular quantity of controlled substance. A person of 
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ordinary intelligence would understand the statute that way. 
But the Tax Commission didn't rely on the amount that anybody 
takes. The only evidence is that the very minimum dosage 
for someone taking these pills would be 5 pills, and more 
commonly 50 - 100. The lack of any definition of the term 
in the statute and the lack of any regulations interpreting 
the statute, render the obscure definition relied on from 
the medical profession to make every pill a "dosage unit" 
untenable and, if the statute must be interpreted that way, 
the statute itself is unconstitutionally vague. 
VI. 
THE ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
IN THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND UNDER ARTICLE 1, 
SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution states that "no person shall be . . . compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Article 
I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides "the accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." 
The Fifth Amendment secures the right not to provide information 
as long as that information may be used in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding. Garvey v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1974). 
The rights provided by the Amendment arise whenever the government 
seeks information that will subject the individual to criminal 
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liability. I^d. at 255. The possession of amphetamines without 
a prescription is illegal under both Utah and Federal law. 
The United States Supreme Court has established 
a test to determine whether or not a tax statute violates 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, thus 
making penalties for non-compliance unenforceable. The test 
consists of three elements: 
(1) Whether the tax is in an area permeated 
with penal laws and therefore directed towards 
a select group inherently suspected of criminal 
activities; 
(2) Whether, in order to comply with the tax, 
one is compelled to provide information which 
he might reasonably suppose to be available 
to prosecuting authorities; and 
(3) Whether the compelled information is such 
as would surely provide a significant link 
in the chain of evidence tending to establish 
guilt. 
See Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. U.S., 390 
U.S. 39 (1968). 
Under the federal statute in Marchetti, an individual 
was required to register with the Internal Revenue Service, 
buy wagering stamps, and post the stamps in a conspicuous 
place. The Court found the statute created a "real and appreciable 
. . . hazard of incrimination." Ld. at 48. The Supreme Court 
found that the "petitioner was confronted by a comprehensive 
system of federal and state prohibitions against wagering 
activities, he was required to provide information which he 
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might reasonably suppose would be available to prosecuting 
authorities, and which would surely prove a significant link 
in the chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt." 
Id. 
In Leary v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court 
considered the Federal Marihuana Tax Act. That Act imposed 
a tax on marihuana transfers as well as an occupational tax 
on those who dealt in the drug. It required that marihuana 
transfers be carried out on written forms provided by the 
government. The IRS was to keep copies of the forms and make 
them available for inspection by treasury personnel and state 
and loccil officials. The Supreme Court struck down the act 
as being in violation of the Fifth Amendment rights of those 
subject to it. 
The mere purchase of stamps under Utah's Illegal 
Drug Tax Stamp Act is an admission of illegal activity. The 
law does not apply to persons lawfully in possession of controlled 
substances. U.C.A. § 59-19-107(2). The possession of controlled 
substances is an area permeated with penal laws. In addition, 
the very purchase of the tax stamps provides information which 
the purchaser might suppose would be available to prosecuting 
authorities, i.e. the identity of the purchaser. There is 
nothing in the statute to prevent the Tax Commission from 
providing prosecuting authorities with information about the 
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purchasers, such as their appearance, the amount of tax stamps 
purchased, or the license number of their vehicle. The statute 
also requires the stamps to be affixed to the controlled sub-
stances. Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-105 (1953, as amended). 
In any prosecution for possession of controlled substances, 
an element of scienter--knowing possession—must be shown. 
Any person who attempts to comply with the Illegal Drug Stamp 
Tax Act would thus be required to provide a significant piece 
of evidence tending to show guilt by providing direct evidence 
of knowing possession of illegal controlled substances. The 
purchase and display of the stamps is a significant link in 
a chain of evidence tending to establish guilt for possession 
of controlled substances. Because each of the three elements 
of the test for illegal self-incrimination required by a tax 
law is satisfied, the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act should be 
held unconstitutional under the Utah and United States Constitu-
tions. 
VII. 
THE TAX ASSESSED IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTES 
AN EXCESSIVE FINE OR FORFEITURE IN VIOLATION 
OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution prohibit 
imposition of excessive fines or the infliction of cruel and 
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unusual punishment. To assert a tax of $22,000 and a penalty 
of an additional $22,000 against Zissi on the basis of alleged 
possession of amphetamine tablets worth no more than $150 
constitutes an excessive fine. Presuming that the legislature 
could pass a tax of any size it wanted for the possession 
of drugs, the tax imposed is not proportionate with that assessable 
to others. A person in possession of an identical quantity 
of amphetamine powder would probably not be taxed at all. 
The fortituous situation of finding pills rather than powder 
does not change the amount of controlled substance or its 
danger to the public. It is cruel and unusual and an excessive 
fine to impose the tax in this case when it would not be imposed 
in those cases. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibits sentences that are disproportionate to 
the crime committed. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
This Court should adopt and apply a proportionality analysis 
and hold that the tax and penalty assessed against Mr. Zissi 
in this case is constitutionally invalid because Mr. Zissi 
is taxed a total of $44,000 while a person in possession of 
an identical quantity of amphetamine powder would not be taxed, 
or at the least, at a disproportionately lower rate. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has referred 
to the Eighth Amendment as involving only criminal sanctions 
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when it refused to extend the amendment to corporal punishment 
in schools, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 669 (1977), the Utah 
Constitutional provision has never been so narrowly interpreted. 
At any rate, it should be recognized that the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act is a criminal or quasi-criminal statute to which 
the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual 
punishment is applicable. The United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
This Court has often stated that the question 
whether a particular statutorily defined penalty 
is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory 
construction. Our inquiry in this regard has 
traditionally proceeded on two levels. First, 
we have set out to determine whether Congress, 
in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates 
either expressly or impliedly a preference 
for one label or the other. Second, where 
Congress had indicated an intention to establish 
a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether 
the statutory scheme was so punitive either 
in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. 
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 
(1980). 
By calling the penalty imposed on possession of 
controlled substances a tax, apparently the legislature wanted 
the penalty to appear to be a civil one. However, U.C.A, 
§ 59-19-106 makes failure to obtain the drug stamps a third-degree 
felony for which a specially enhanced penalty of $10,000 is 
provided. U.C.A. § 59-19-106. Even with doubling the usual 
fine for a third-degree felony, the tax and penalty in this 
case far exceed the possible criminal penalty. 
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The Supreme Court has indicated that there are seven 
traditional elements in determining whether an act is penal 
or regulatory in character. All of the factors are relevant 
to the inquiry, and may point in different directions. The 
factors are: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint, whether it has historically 
been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes 
into play only on a finding of scienter, whether 
its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, 
whether the behavior to which it applies is 
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose 
to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive 
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
In this case, the sanction of a tax nearly 150 times 
the value of the property taxed would certainly be regarded 
as punishment, and the requirement of the payment of such 
an amount requires a finding of knowing possession, since 
the legislature did not intend to tax persons such as common 
carriers in unknowing possession of controlled substances. 
The operation of this extremely punitive tax clearly promotes 
the traditional aims of retribution and deterrence, and the 
property which is taxed is already illegal to possess. It 
is submitted that there is no purpose other than punishment 
and deterrence which could be the purpose of this statute. 
Thus, of the factors which relate to this case at all, each 
of the factors cited by the Supreme Court indicate that this 
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statute is not a civil statute but is in reality a criminal 
statute to which the prohibition against excessive fines clearly 
applied. 
CONCLUSION 
The pills which were seized from defendant's truck 
were seized illegally because the initial stopping of petitioner's 
vehicle constituted an illegal seizure where the driver's 
license checkpoint at which petitioner was stopped was created 
at the whim of the field officers on patrol, without written 
guidelines, directions or policies and procedures to govern 
the location and conduct of a driver's license roadblock. 
The Tax Commission has construed the statute to 
maximum disadvantage of the taxpayer. It clearly took the 
punitive intent of the statute to heart. However, the insistence 
on taxing amphetamines by the pill despite the evidence that 
amphetamines are typically sold by weight, and the admission 
that if these pills had been crushed, they would have been 
taxed by weight, create an equal protection violation. Taxing 
$22,000 for possession of pills while the tax would be zero 
if the pills had been ground up is a distinction without a 
difference, an exaltation of form over controlled substance, 
and is arbitrary and irrational. 
Second, the Collection Division's interpretation 
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of dosage unit to mean each individual pill, regardless of 
the quantity of pills constituting a dosage creates a problem 
of vagueness. The words dosage unit have a meaning intel-
ligible to the ordinary person, just as they were to Gary 
Nuffer, of how much a person takes. The definition urged 
by the Collection Division in reliance on a specialized meaning 
known only to the medical profession makes the statute unintel-
ligible to persons of ordinary intelligence and therefore 
void for vagueness as a denial of due process. To avoid these 
constitutional problems, to give the statutory words their 
ordinary meaning, and to construe the tax statute strictly 
against the taxing authority, it is appropriate to determine 
that these amphetamines should be treated like any other amphet-
amines and taxed on the basis of weight. Or, at a minimum, 
the Court should determine the dosage which would be taken 
by people using these controlled substances. The minimum 
amount in evidence is 5 pills per dosage unit, and the maximum 
amount is 100, with an average somewhere in between at 50 
pills. 
Becaues it does not prohibit the Tax Commission 
from providing information relevant to determining the identity 
of Tax Stamp purchasers and because affixing stamps to controlled 
substances provides evidence of the crucial criminal element 
of intent, the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violates Mr. Zissi's 
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rights against self-incrimination and should be held invalid 
and unenforceable. 
Finally, because the statute violates the principle 
of proportionality by imposing a huge tax on possession of 
amphetamine pills while imposing no tax on the same quantity 
of amphetamines in powder form, the tax constitutes an excessive 
fine and is prohibited. 
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ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT 59-19-105 
59-19-103. Tax imposed on marihuana and controlled sub-
stances. 
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled substances as defined 
under this chapter at the following rates: 
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a gram, $3.50; 
(b) on each gram of controlled substance, or each portion of a gram, 
$200; and 
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not sold by 
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000. 
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under this chapter, a quantity of 
marihuana or other controlled substance is measured by the weight of the 
substance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by dosage units when the 
substance is not sold by weight, in the dealer's possession. A quantity of a 
controlled substance is dilute if it consists of a detectable quantity of pure 
controlled substance and any excipients of fillers. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-103, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 3. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or afiSrmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT V m 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ART. I, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
nroeess of law. 
ART. I, §9 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines—Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be im-
posed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons 
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
ART. I, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ART. I, § 14 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
A
* T . I, § 24 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 




Findings of Fact/ Conclusions of Lawf 
Final Decision of Tax Commission 55 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
LARRY J. ZISSI, 
Petitioner/ 
v. 
AUDIT DIVISION OF THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
pursuant to the Rules of Administrative Procedure and the 
Administrative Procedures Act for formal adjudicative proceedings 
on the 28th day of February 1989. James E. Harward, Presiding 
Officer, heard the matter for and in behalf of the Tax 
Commission. Wayne Holman, Gary Nuffer and Lee Dever appeared 
representing the Respondent. David Bird appeared representing 
Larry Zissi. Mr. Zissi was also present. 
Evidence was taken, arguments were made and the matter 
submitted to the Presiding Officer for his recommendation. Based 
upon the recommendation of the Presiding Officer and the facts and 
evidence presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is the illegal drug stamp tax. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 88 2508 
Appeal No. 88-25 
2. The period in question is June 4, 1988. 
3. On said date the Petitioner was stopped by the Utah 
County Sheriff's office in a 1983 Chevrolet pickup truck license 
plate number NC8331 at a routine traffic stop in conjunction with 
a drivers license roadblock check. 
4. The vehicle was owned by the Petitioner. 
5. Subsequent to the stop and as a result of the 
search of the vehicle, the sheriff's office located a shaving kit 
behind the drivers side of the vehicle which contained 
approximately 550 tablets which were stipulated as being 
amphetamines. 
6. No drug stamps were affixed to the amphetamines. 
7. A brief case located in the Petitioner's vehicle 
contained money and was the property of the Petitioner. 
8. At the routine traffic stop, the officers were 
suspicious of the vehicle. When approaching the drivers side, 
they smelled the odor of marijuana. They then requested that the 
vehicle pull to the side of the road. At the side of the road, 
the Petitioner then handed over to the officer a baggie and a 
roach apparently containing marijuana. Thereafter the vehicle was 
searched for any other contraband or illegal drugs. During the 
course of the search, the amphetamines were located. 
9. The sheriff's office stopped all cars and vehicles 
at the roadblock. 
10. The Respondent assessed a tax and penalty according 
to state statute of $22,000 tax and $22,000 penalty. 
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11. The tax was computed by taking the 550 pills divided 
by 50 dosage units equals 11 times the statutory tax of $2,000 
equaling $22,000 plus a 100% penalty. (Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103 
<c>.) 
12. Under the terms of the statute, the term dosage unit 
is equivalent to one pill. 
13. Amphetamines such as these are sold as pills and not 
by weight. 
14. The Petitioner's statement that the shave kit did 
not belong to him is selfserving and given little weight. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The taxes imposed upon a controlled substance as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103 et. seq. in the sum of $2000 
for each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not 
sold by weight. 
2. A stamp must be purchased to evidence the payment of 
the tax imposed by the Utah Code. Failure to affix the stamp or 
to purchase the stamp results in an imposition of the tax plus a 
civil penalty of 100% of the tax. (Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106.) 
3. The Tax Commission is bound to follow the state 
statutes. (State Tax Commission vs Wright 596 Pacific Second 634, 
636 Utah 1979.) However, the Commission is not a judicial body 
established under the constitution of the State of Utah nor is it 
empowered or authorized to determine the legality or 
constitutionality of legislative enactments. (See Shea vs Utah 
State Tax Commission 120 Pacific Second 274, 275 Utah 1941; State 
Tax Commission vs Wright 596 Pacific Second 634, 636 (Utah 1979); 
and Belco Petroleum Corporation vs State Board of Equalization 587 
Pacific Second 204 (Wyoming, 1978).) ^ ^  _ ^„ 
Appeal NO. 88-25f 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Petitioner has raised five issues in this matter. 
They are: 
1. Whether or not the evidence should be suppressed due 
to an unconstitutional search and seizure. 
2. Whether there is sufficient evidence that would 
indicate that the illegal drugs were in the possession of the 
petitioner. 
3. Whether the statutory construction of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-19-101 et. seq. is vague and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
4. Whether the Petitioner's equal protection rights . 
have been violated. 
5. Whether or not there has been a violation of the 
Petitioner's due process. 
The Tax Commission, in reviewing the evidence and 
arguments at the hearing, shall divide the issues raised by the 
Petitioner into those of substantive and constitutional 
questions. The constitutional questions involve the suppression 
under an unconstitutional search and seizure, and the equal 
protection and due process arguments. The substantive issues are 
those relating to possession and statutory construction as it 
relates to definition of dose or dosage unit. However, the two 
issues overlap somewhat on the definition of dosage unit in that 
the Petitioner argues that the term is sufficiently vague as to 
render the application of the statute either discriminatory or 
void for vagueness. 
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As to the constitution issues, the Tax Commission is an 
administrative body established for the administration and the 
overseeing of the taxing statutes. As such, the Tax Commission 
has no authority to determine the constitutionality of a state 
statute. The state statute in all cases before the State Tax 
Commission is presumed to be constitutional and therefore 
correct. Therefore, the arguments as it relates to 
constitutionality cannot be determined by the Tax Commission and 
are therefore denied. 
The argument that the stop and search was an 
unconstitutional search and seizure suffers from the same problem 
in that the Tax Commission has no authority to rule upon the 
constitutionality of such conduct. However, the Tax Commission 
notes that it appears that the search was not a discretionary 
search. Every vehicle was stopped. It also appears that there 
are standards and guidelines published by the Utah County 
Sheriff's office that govern such roadblock type searches. 
The Tax Commission further finds that the arguments of 
the Petitioner relating to equal protection and due process also 
relate to a determination by the Commission as to whether or not 
the statute is unconstitutional or void for vagueness. These 
determinations cannot be made by the Tax Commission. However, the 
Tax Commission notes that the statute on its face is clear and 
does not leave the matter of determination open which would make 
the statute void. 
The Tax Commission finds that the testimony was clear and 
convincing that a dosage unit under the terms of the statute is 
one pill. 
Appeal No. 88-251 
The Tax Commission now turns to the substantive issues 
before it. Those substantive issues relate to the elements of the 
offense or the need for a tax to be paid upon the illegal drugs. 
The statute requires that a tax be imposed upon an illegal 
controlled substance which is not sold by weight of $2000 for 
every 50 dosage units. To be responsible for the payment of that 
tax, a person must acquire or possess in any manner seven or more 
grams of any controlled substance or ten or more dosage units of 
any controlled substance which is not sold by weight. The Tax 
Commission finds that there is sufficient evidence before it to 
find that the Petitioner had acquired "in any manner" or possessed 
ten or more dosage units of any controlled substance which is not 
sold by weight. 
It was stipulated that the controlled substance did not 
have affixed to it the tax stamps which evidence payment of the 
taxes required by the Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-101 et. seq. 
The Petitioner argues that the controlled substance which 
is the subject of this matter really is in all actuality sold by 
weight and therefore the tax is substantially less on the 
controlled substances than that as imposed by the Respondent. The 
Petitioner finds that this argument fails. The evidence was clear 
that the controlled substance was in pill form. In pill form, it 
is sold by pill and not by weight. 
Therefore, it is the decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, that the Petitioner's request be denied. 
Specifically, the search and seizure which resulted in the 
obtaining of the controlled substances was not unconstitutional. 
-6-
Further, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the 
Petitioner did have in his possession or in some manner acquired 
the controlled substance. Finally, that the term dosage unit used 
in the statute means one pill. Finally, the Tax Commission finds 
that the Petitioner's arguments as it relates to equal protection 
and violation of due process are denied. 
DATED this ^ I At day of (JUJIX^ , 1989. 
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Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
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